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TERRY'S IMPOSSIBILITY
WILLIAM J. STUNTZ*
Ron Allen and Ross Rosenberg have written a terrific arti-
cle.' It is fascinating, thought-provoking, and all the other
things we say about good scholarship. More than that, it is
right. There is indeed a difference, and a huge one, between
what Hayek called "grown" and "made" systems-between sys-
tems that evolve from the bottom up and systems ordered from
the top down.2 Law enforcement and the law that regulates it do
indeed function best when seen, as they should be, as "grown"
rather than "made." And a great deal of legal theory does indeed
treat policing and Fourth Amendment law as "made" systems, as
if they were sets of pieces in a jigsaw puzzle box, and all one
need do to get the perfect picture is arrange all the pieces just so.
Allen and Rosenberg make these points effectively and engag-
ingly, and I have little to add to their article.
What I wish to do instead is to recast Allen and Rosenberg's
argument, apply it to Terry doctrine (Allen and Rosenberg talk a
good deal about Fourth Amendment doctrine in general, but say
little about the law and practice of street stops, which is the
chief focus of this symposium), and, I hope, extract a few lessons
in the process. The central idea of the recasting and application
goes as follows. As Allen and Rosenberg note, most legal theory
suffers from a tendency to underestimate the magnitude and im-
portance of error costs. That tendency is a particular problem
when it comes to legal regulation of street-level policing, because
that kind of legal regulation is especially prone to error. Even if
one does not buy the terms of Allen and Rosenberg's argument-
and I do buy them-there is no getting around the central diffi-
" Class of 1962 Professor and Horace W. Goldsmith Research Professor, Uni-
versity of Virginia School of Law. I thank Ron Allen, Anne Coughlin, Debra Living-
ston, Dan Richman, and Elizabeth Scott for helpful comments.
1 Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits
of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1149
(1998).
2 This is the central point of the article.
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culty of Terry and the law it has spawned. Most of what we
would like that law to accomplish is impossible; the necessary
legal judgments cannot be made with even a decent degree of ac-
curacy. When regulating street policing, we are living in a land
of bad choices.
I. BACKGROUND
It is best to begin by defining the subject a little more pre-
cisely. Terry v. Ohio3 states a rule: A police officer may conduct
a brief search of a suspect's outer clothing if the officer has rea-
4
sonable grounds for suspecting that the suspect has a weapon.
Terry does not define "reasonable suspicion," but it is clearly
something less than probable cause.
That rule has spawned a large and important body of law,
with three other rules and two doctrinal open spaces playing key
roles. The rules are these: (1) Police have "seized" someone if a
reasonable person in the suspect's position would not feel free to
leave.' .(2) Police can briefly seize and detain suspects based on
reasonable suspicion of past or future crime.6 (3) The Terry
standard applies to stops of vehicles as well as pedestrians-
meaning both that vehicles can be stopped based on reasonable
suspicion of crime7 (or, of course, based on traffic offenses)8 and
that the police can conduct a cursory search of the vehicle based
on reasonable suspicion of the presence of a weapon.'
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
See id. at 27.
5 This rule (standard, really) is commonly associated with United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). For a more recent application, see Florida v. Bos-
tick, 501 U.S. 429, 433-40 (1991).
6 See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) (holding that stops based on
suspicion of prior felony are permissible). In Terry, the stop was based on suspicion
that Terry and his colleagues were about to rob a store. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-7.
See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
s See, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
9 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1045-52 (1983). A fourth rule is as impor-
tant as the other three if it turns out to be stable; it is still too soon to tell whether
that will be so. In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the Court appeared
to hold that any crime could count for purposes of satisfying Fourth Amendment
standards (in Whren, probable cause, but the logic would apply to Terry's reasonable
suspicion standard), even if the suspected "crime" was one the officer did not care
about and the state never enforced. For an excellent discussion of Whren and its re-
lationship to other recent cases involving traffic stops, see David A. Sklansky, Traf-
fic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SuP.
CT. REV. 271.
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The two key open spaces involve the meaning of the first of
those three rules-the definition of "seizure"-and the content of
the reasonable suspicion standard, which appears in the other
two. The truth is that ordinary people never feel free to termi-
nate a conversation with a police officer; if the "seizure" standard
means what it says, every street encounter between a police offi-
cer and a citizen is subject to Terry's reasonable suspicion stan-
dard. That obviously is not the case." But what the standard
does mean is far from clear; the likelihood is that it means dif-
ferent things in different places, according to different judges' in-
tuitions about the proper level of police coercion in street en-
counters. Similarly, reasonable suspicion has never received a
solid definition. (Perhaps it can't.) Courts have a fair amount of
room to maneuver; the standard seems to vary depending on the
judges' sense of how intrusive or coercive the relevant police be-
havior is, and how serious or threatening the suspected crime is.
As this brief description suggests, Terry doctrine seems to repre-
sent a serious attempt to regulate street-level policing, to forbid
bad police encounters while permitting good ones. Those un-
familiar with Fourth Amendment history might suppose that the
law has always done this, but in fact Terry and the huge caselaw
it has spawned are a new thing, a clear departure from the
Fourth Amendment's past. Before the late 1960s, policing on the
street was basically unregulated. Effective remedies for police
misconduct didn't exist until the middle of this century, when
large numbers of states began to adopt an across-the-board ex-
clusionary rule, a norm that became universal with Mapp v.
Ohio" in 1961. Even then, loitering and vagrancy laws were
sufficiently broad to give the police authority to stop or arrest
almost anyone, or at least anyone they were plausibly interested
in stopping or arresting. 2 Probable cause was no obstacle, be-
cause it was so easily established. Not until the latter half of the
'0 For a typical example of the gap between the nominal standard and the real
one, see Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431.
n 367 U.S. 643 (1961). On the rush of state adoptions of the exclusionary rule,
see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-32 (1960) (surveying state rules on
the subject over a roughly fifty-year period).
12 For the classic treatment of the use and abuse of old-style vagrancy and loi-
tering law, see Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and its Administration, 104 U. PA.
L. REV. 603 (1956); see also William 0. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion,
70 YALE L.J. 1 (1960) (emphasizing the connection between vagrancy law and the
arrest power).
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1960s, when those loitering and vagrancy laws started to fall to
vagueness challenges, 3 did ordinary police-citizen encounters on
the street become a serious Fourth Amendment issue. 4 Terry
represents the first time the legal system really faced the ques-
tion of how to rein in street policing, how to use legal tools to
make the police behave reasonably on the ground.
Assessing how well the system has answered that question
is a complicated task. A good place to begin is by understanding
the difficulty of the job the system undertook when, thirty years
ago, Earl Warren explained why Officer McFadden's frisk of
Terry's jacket was reasonable.
II. THE DIFFICULTY OF POLICING STREET POLICING
A great deal of legal theory aims at two goals: (1) Determin-
ing what is optimal behavior by one or another set of regulated
actors; and (2) figuring out what set of legal rules will create the
incentive for those regulated actors to behave optimally. Those
are sensible goals if, but only if, the judgments they require are
ones the relevant legal institutions-here, the courts-can fea-
sibly make. But courts cannot determine, certainly not in any
way reducible to a legal formula, what is optimal (or reasonable,
or fair, the choice of terms does not matter) police behavior on
the street. Even if they could do that, courts lack the tools to
give police officers the right incentives.
A. Liability Rules
Consider the enterprise of defining what is, and isn't, proper
police behavior. The key to that enterprise is some rough com-
parative assessment of the costs and benefits of different police
tactics. Right away, one must engage in some serious simplifi-
cation in order even to begin thinking about the problem. Street-
level policing has large, complicated, and poorly understood so-
cial effects. Aggressive police tactics may send the signal that
3 See, e.g., Alegata v. Commonwealth, 231 N.E. 2d 201 (Mass. 1967) (holding a
statute defining vagrant as one who is idle, without visible means of support, and
has lived without lawful employment, void for vagueness); Seattle v. Drew, 423 P.2d
522 (Wash. 1967) (holding a statute prohibiting loitering abroad unconstitutionally
vague as it failed to provide ascertainable standards of guilt).
4 See William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 559-60 & nn.28-29 (1992), and sources cited
therein.
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the police are in control of the streets, and hence that the streets
are safe for ordinary citizens. That signal could in turn have
enormous social benefits; the perception that the streets are safe
could lead to greater law-abiding street traffic, which in turn
would lead to the reality of safer streets.'5 Or, such tactics may
send the signal that young men of the wrong race or ethnicity
are automatic targets for the police, and hence that the police
are a hostile presence in the community. That signal could have
large social costs: If the police and, through them, the criminal
justice system, come to be seen as illegitimate, the norms of law-
abiding behavior could unravel, with the streets becoming less
safe, not more so.'6 More plausibly, such tactics may send a mix
of these two signals, with the mix varying depending on local cir-
cumstances.
These kinds of benefits and costs can easily dwarf the effects
of a given kind of police behavior on particular suspects. Indeed,
one might well think that these diffuse social signals ought to be
what street-level policing is about. But there is no workable
mechanism by which a court can determine what mix of signals a
given kind of policing in a given neighborhood sends. The diffi-
culty is one that cuts to the heart of legal regulation in this area:
The social effects of particular kinds of police behavior are likely
to be heavily dependent on context-on the community's culture,
on its past relationship to the local police, on the culture of the
police force, on its racial makeup, on the character of local poli-
tics,... I could go on, but you get the point. Courts cannot
measure or evaluate these things, and yet these things deter-
mine whether different types of street-level policing are good or
bad-whether they impose large costs on the community, and
whether, if they do, they nevertheless create substantial bene-
fits. Moreover, even if courts could measure these political and
social variables, the logical consequence would be a law of street-
level policing that varied from neighborhood to neighborhood.
That would send its own negative signals.
So let us simplify things. Assume, for the sake of argument,
16 This is the essence of the famous "broken windows" argument. See James Q.
Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at
29. For a more detailed elaboration of the thesis, see GEORGE L. KELLING &
CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS (1996).
16 This may be what our society has experienced with drug enforcement over the
past decade. See William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming Nov. 1998).
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that there is only one set of costs worth worrying about: The
injuries suffered by individual victims of unreasonable police
stops and frisks.
There are at least four distinct harms that those victims
might suffer. The first is a harm to the victim's privacy-the
injury suffered if some agent of the state rummages around in
the victim's briefcase, or examines the contents of his jacket
pockets. The second is what Sherry Colb nicely labels "targeting
harm," 7 the injury suffered by one who is singled out by the po-
lice and publicly treated like a criminal suspect. Third is the
injury that flows from discrimination, the harm a black suspect
feels when he believes he is treated the way he is treated be-
cause he is black. Fourth is the harm that flows from police vio-
lence, the physical injury and associated fear of physical injury
that attends the improper police use of force. Of course, the list
is really more complicated than that, because victims do not suf-
fer one of these injuries to the exclusion of the others; rather, a
mix of these various injuries occurs in every case of police mis-
conduct on the street.
Even without that last complication, every one of these
common harms creates an unsolvable problem for the legal sys-
tem. The first two-harm to privacy and targeting harm-are
both purely subjective and often absent. The contents of my
briefcase and jacket pockets are neither personal nor interesting
(well, interesting to me, but not to anyone else), and it doesn't
bother me if a police officer cares to know what they are. I am
far from the only person who feels this way, yet many others feel
very differently. The same is true of Colb's targeting harm: For
some, the experience of being stopped is a humiliating trauma;
for others, it is no big deal. And though there are some objec-
tively verifiable markers one might use (one could presume that
police examination of diaries caused some significant injury),
those markers do not solve most cases (most briefcases don't
have diaries in them).
This is a disabling problem for any damages regime, for such
regimes require measurement of the victim's injury, and these
injuries cannot accurately be measured. (To my mind, this is one
of the great underrated arguments for an exclusionary rule.)
17 Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Ju-
risprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1456 (1996).
1218 [Vol. 72:1213
TERRY'S IMPOSSIBILITY
But the problem goes beyond damages calculation; it exists even
in a regime that uses the suppression of evidence as the primary
remedy for street-level police illegality. Whatever remedy the
system uses, it must be able to generate liability rules that tell
the police what conduct they can and can't engage in. Those li-
ability rules necessarily depend on the harms that different sorts
of police conduct cause. It makes no sense for Fourth Amend-
ment law to regulate police encounters of a kind that cause no
harm (save the "harm" of catching criminals). If we do not know
what harms are serious and what harms are not-or, more pre-
cisely, what behaviors cause serious harm and what behaviors
don't-we are unlikely to do a good job of crafting rules designed
to minimize serious harms. Were it otherwise, the contemporary
law of workplace sexual harassment would be both clearer and
more successful. It isn't, because it can't be. Law designed to
protect the privacy interest in jacket pockets and the autonomy
interest in not feeling targeted is basically no different.
The third injury, discrimination, suffers from a different
problem. To be sure, the pain suffered by victims of police dis-
crimination is subjective in the same way that harm to privacy
and targeting harm are subjective. But with discrimination, we
do have objective markers, facts that separate cases where the
injury is likely to be present from cases where it isn't. We can
compare how police treat white suspects and black ones, or we
can find out the percentages of white and black drivers whose
vehicles are stopped. Information of that sort is hard to come by,
but not impossible, as the growing number of news stories about
"driving while black" attest.8 And information of that sort would
allow courts to do a decent job of identifying cases in which sus-
pects felt the harm that flows from discrimination.
Unfortunately, felt harm does not necessarily correlate with
police misconduct. Blacks in a given jurisdiction may be stopped
much more often than whites, and that disproportion may give
rise to anger and upset among those blacks who are stopped, yet
that jurisdiction's police may be behaving quite properly. Crime
rates are not constant across population groups; if the racial
breakdown of suspects tracks the racial breakdown of criminals,
the police will stop many more people in some groups than in
18 See Sklansky, supra note 9, at 312-13 & nn.196-97, and sources cited therein.
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others.19 That much explains why even the most enlightened,
community-sensitive police force will engage in tactics that have
a racially disparate impact, and the disparities can be quite
large. Once one acknowledges that point, it becomes nearly im-
possible for courts to distinguish racist police harassment from
good, color-blind police work. Indeed, the difficulty is greater
still. Historically, police racism often took the form of underen-
forcement-of ignoring black crime because so much of it was
visited on black victims?2' The police forces with the smallest
racial disproportion in street stops actually may be the most
racist police forces. 21 Given these cross-currents, reliably sepa-
rating bad discrimination from good law enforcement (remember
that good law enforcement is likely to produce racially disparate
outcomes) is probably beyond courts' ability.
The centrality of drugs makes this problem still worse.
Drug markets are not the same everywhere; one tends to find
street markets in poor urban neighborhoods, and more discreet
means of distribution in more upscale areas. In late twentieth-
century America, poor urban neighborhoods are both dispropor-
tionately black and heavily segregated. It is much easier for the
police to catch buyers and sellers in street markets than in the
kind of drug markets that function more discreetly in more
middle-class, and whiter, neighborhoods. Street markets also
'9 For a good discussion of the large gap between black and white crime rates,
see MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 49-80 (1995).
20 We do not have good arrest data from the Jim Crow South, but we do have a
fair amount of data about prison demographics, and the racial breakdown of prison-
ers probably correlates fairly well with the racial breakdown of arrestees. Consider
this statistic: South Carolina in 1950 had a population that was nearly 40% black,
see U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 36
(1953), and its black population was surely considerably poorer than its white
population, meaning that the level of black crime was surely higher than the level of
white crime. Yet more than two-thirds of the state's imprisoned felons were white.
See FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS: PRISONERS IN
STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS 55 (1954). The obvious explanation is that South
Carolina's law enforcement apparatus did not much care about crime confined to
black neighborhoods, which is where most crimes committed by blacks would have
taken place.
21 Again, prison statistics from the early 1950s are suggestive. In the South as a
whole (defined as the former Confederacy) in 1950, 25% of the population was black,
and 44% of incarcerated felons were black. The high level of race discrimination in
the South plainly kept that disproportion down-in the Northeast at the same time,
5% of the population but 29% of incarcerated felons were black. See sources cited
supra note 20.
1220 [Vol. 72:1213
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seem to cause more collateral social injury. Put these points to-
gether, and you have a recipe for racially disparate enforcement
of the drug laws. Yet the racial disparity arises naturally, with-
out any racial animus, and it is very hard to see how the legal
system can combat it by the way it regulates street policing.
(Even assuming it should be combated-a view I hold, but one
that is quite contestable.)'
Finally, consider the fourth harm to victims of police mis-
conduct on the street-physical injury, and the fear associated
with it. Here, at last, there is no subjectivity. The law deals
with physical harm all the time, and does so reasonably well,
precisely because it is so often verifiable. Of course, fear is sub-
jective, but it is entirely plausible to credit claims of emotional
distress when they are coupled with personal injury-as, again,
the law regularly does in other settings.
In those other settings, though, physical harm is strongly
correlated with misbehavior by the one who caused it. Certainly
that is so where the injurer intended to bring about the harm. In
some settings-think of police interrogation-the same holds
true for the police. But it is not true on the street. One of the
sad truths about policing that makes legal regulation madden-
ingly difficult is that violence is sometimes-not "very rarely," or
"almost never," but sometimes-necessary. Police officers must
bring those they stop or arrest under control. They also must
protect themselves. Sometimes they must use force in order to
accomplish those tasks.
That truth gives rise to two questions: When, and how
much? If the law is to do a good job regulating low-level police
violence on the street, it must be able to provide answers. Thus
far, it has not done so. The most glaring omission from Terry
doctrine is any working standard governing when a police officer
may strike a suspect. It is reasonable to wonder whether that
absence is something more than an oversight, whether courts are
simply incapable of taking adequate account of the many factors
that go into sound decisionmaking about the use of force. Cer-
tainly the reported cases on excessive force do not allay this con-
cern; one cannot read them without sensing how hard is the
struggle to articulate a legal standard that has bite without
22 The argument in this paragraph is developed in more detail in Stuntz, supra
note 16.
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disabling police self-protection. Good officers and good depart-
ments behave differently than bad ones, but courts seem unable
to craft a workable legal formula to capture the difference. That
is why the law of excessive force is so evanescent, and so toler-
ant.
Any working system of legal regulation must be able to
separate the cases where harm exists from the cases where it
doesn't. At least where the harm is to privacy, or to the interest
in avoiding being singled out, street-level Fourth Amendment
law cannot do that. Any working rule structure must be able to
distinguish between the conduct it wishes to tolerate and the
conduct it wishes to stamp out-and to define the distinction, at
least somewhat, so that actors can adjust their behavior accord-
ingly. With respect to police discrimination on the street, that is
beyond courts' capacity. The same is probably true for the kind
of police violence that sometimes attends street stops.
B. Remedies
The enterprise of making sensible law for street-level polic-
ing is, in short, very hard. Enforcing that law may be even
harder. Consider the two primary tools courts use to rein in bad
police behavior: exclusion of illegally seized evidence, and dam-
ages for the victim of the misbehavior, assessed either against
the individual officer or against the government that employs
him.
The problem with the exclusionary rule in this setting is
simple. Even those who defend the rule must acknowledge its
most basic limit: It cannot reach police behavior that is discon-
nected from evidence gathering or criminal prosecutions. If a
police officer pats down my outer clothing in the hope of finding
drugs or illegal weapons that will lead to a criminal prosecution,
the presence of the exclusionary rule will cause the officer to
think twice about whether he is obeying the law. If, on the other
hand, the officer pats me down with no intention of prosecuting
or even arresting me, but solely in order to seize the drugs or
weapons I may have (or simply to harass me), the exclusionary
rule will not matter to him. And if the officer is subduing a vio-
lent suspect, the exclusionary rule plays no part in the decision
to use force (or how much force to use), since in this context the
use of force produces no evidence, and hence provides nothing to
suppress.
1222 [Vol. 72:1213
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All of which leads to a critically important characteristic of
street-level policing: A lot of it is not about gathering evidence or
prosecuting offenders, but about keeping order, or raising the
costs to gangs of congregating, or confiscating weapons to get
them off the street. The law can threaten to suppress evidence if
the police do any of those things badly or unfairly, but the threat
can have no power.
This is not to say that the exclusionary rule doesn't matter.
On the contrary, in some settings it matters very much: Some-
times police officers initiate street encounters hoping to make an
arrest that will generate a prosecution. It is only to say that the
exclusionary rule matters to some police-citizen encounters, but
not to others.
Which in turn may make the exclusionary rule's effect on
street-level policing perverse. The rule means that police-citizen
encounters on the street are held to a higher standard when the
encounters lead to criminal prosecution than when they don't.
(When there is no criminal prosecution, the exclusionary rule is
never triggered; thus, there is basically no legal standard at all.)
Thus, the police have a greater incentive to behave properly
when dealing with people who might be serious criminals, the
sort of people the police would like to see locked up, than when
dealing with more ordinary, less dangerous folk. They can be
treated however the police wish. This seems at least strange,
and at most backward. And the exclusionary rule may actually
alter the way police distribute street stops. By raising the cost
(more precisely, reducing the benefit) of stops that are likeliest to
produce evidence of serious crime while leaving other stops unaf-
fected, the exclusionary rule gives the police some incentive at
the margin to change the mix of persons stopped. The rule
makes it somewhat harder for the police to catch drug dealers
and send them to prison. It leaves the ability to stop other peo-
ple, people whom the police do not care about sending to prison,
unregulated. One likely consequence is fewer stops in the first
category, and more stops in the second.' That hardly sounds
23I am assuming a constant level of police activity, so that less of one kind of
encounter means more of others. That assumption is not clearly correct, though it is
plausible. When a given tactic becomes more expensive because of legal chance, the
likeliest police response is a combination of three things: (1) less frequent use of the
now-more-expensive tactic, (2) more leisure (i.e., substituting nothing for the street
encounters that used to happen but are now too expensive) and (3) more frequent
use of some other tactic. There is no telling what the mix of (2) and (3) will be in any
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like an advance for distributive justice.
The exclusionary rule has many virtues, and it may be, on
balance, the least bad remedy available for Fourth Amendment
violations.4 But "least bad" is the right way to put it, especially
in this setting. Suppressing evidence may work reasonably well
when the law is regulating a class of behavior that is almost al-
ways aimed at producing arrests and convictions. Police rarely
search houses save to find suspects whom they wish to arrest
and see charged, to find evidence that will lead to conviction, or
both. Consequently, the exclusionary rule may create fairly good
incentives for the police to obey the law when they search peo-
ple's homes. But when the class of behavior is more complex,
when it sometimes is tied to criminal charges but sometimes
isn't, the exclusionary rule generates problems. It leaves some
behavior unregulated. The unregulated behavior tends to in-
volve citizens who are not serious criminals, or not criminals at
all-that is a large part of why the police do not wish to see them
arrested and prosecuted. And the rule may actually encourage
the police to engage in more of those unregulated encounters, be-
cause it makes those encounters relatively cheaper.
Perhaps, then, we need to shift remedies. If street-level po-
licing is not primarily about catching and prosecuting offenders,
and if the exclusionary rule works well only for police activities
particular case. Thus, it is possible that raising the cost of some stops will simply
reduce the incidence of those stops and leave the incidence of others unchanged. But
the police have some incentives to engage in the enterprise of street policing, and
those incentives presumably continue to operate when the price of some tactics goes
up. It seems reasonable to suppose, then, that some substituting goes on-that
when some police-citizen encounters become more expensive, the police engage in
others.
That does not mean that the exclusionary rule prompts the police to leave sus-
pected drug dealers alone and instead target innocents. I know of no reason to be-
lieve police officers behave that way. It does not mean that the exclusionary rule
prompts the police, at the margin, to ignore the prospect of arrest and conviction,
and seek instead to pursue other goals-get drugs and guns off the street, maintain
order, and so on. Pursuit of those other goals, in the absence of any concern with
justifying arrests or facilitating convictions, means more stops of innocent citizens,
both because the police are less likely to be concerned with satisfying reasonable
suspicion or probable cause standards when they will not be held to those standards
by a court, and because the goals themselves do not require that the police stop only
criminals.
24 This is not the place to rehearse the exclusionary rule debate. I have else-
where tried to examine the basic arguments on both sides, arguing that the issue is
a closer one than the partisans on either side admit. See William J. Stuntz, The Vir-
tues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 443 (1997).
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that are primarily about catching and prosecuting offenders,
then the law should find other remedial tools, other means of
getting the police to take Fourth Amendment standards on the
street seriously.
The obvious alternative is some form of damages or fines.
Make the police officer pay when he violates the law, or at least
make his employer pay. That approach has an obvious virtue: It
does not bestow the largest benefits on the worst actors, as does
the exclusionary rule. It has a second, less obvious virtue: It
does not skew police incentives when dealing with a universe
that includes both criminals and non-criminals. Given these ad-
vantages (and there are others), it is hardly surprising that the
possibility of broader damages liability has long been a common
argument for doing away with the exclusionary rule.
But damages have vices too, including one that has not re-
ceived nearly enough attention in the literature on this subject.
Consider who pays when an officer is held liable for an illegal
search or seizure. Nominally, the liability is the officer's, but in
practice it is his employer's; indemnification is very much the
norm in these cases.' Most arguments for expanded damages
liability would carry this tendency further, and impose liability
on the appropriate government entity directly. The theory is
simple and attractive. General Motors must pay for the torts its
employees commit while on the job; that makes General Motors
internalize the cost of its employees' misbehavior, which in turn
pushes General Motors to do a better job of hiring and supervis-
ing its employees. The same will be true of police departments
and the cities that pay for them.
But cities are not like General Motors, and paying for polic-
ing is not like making cars. Businesses sell products and serv-
ices to people who benefit from those products and services, and
the beneficiaries pay. Businesses that supply private policing-
the biggest growth industry in the world of law enforcement-
are like that. City police forces are not. They tend to devote
their attention not to where the paying customers are, but to
where the street crime is. Street crime tends to be concentrated
in poor neighborhoods, meaning that both criminals and victims
tend to inhabit those neighborhoods (street crime is overwhelm-
25 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section
1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 50-51 & n.16 (1998).
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ingly local). So that is where police are concentrated, where the
greatest number of police man-hours are spent.
Poor neighborhoods thus receive a disproportionate share of
police protection-disproportionate relative to their share of the
population, though not relative to their share of serious crime.
But that police protection is paid for out of general tax revenues,
and the taxes come primarily from other neighborhoods, where
property values and sales receipts are higher. (The large major-
ity of police work for local governments, not state or national
ones.) Policing in most American cities is thus redistributive:
Its beneficiaries are poorer than its payors.
This fact has very large implications for the law. Broad
damages liability for police misconduct on the street would raise
the cost of providing police services in poor neighborhoods; it
would raise the risk that any given nonconsensual police-citizen
encounter would lead to a payout from the city treasury. The
added cost will not be paid by the residents of those neighbor-
hoods; it will be paid by people in other, wealthier, less crime-
ridden places. When the taxes rise high enough, those people
can always move out of the jurisdiction. Wise local governments
are loath to push that particular envelope. The obvious alterna-
tive is to scale back the level of policing those governments pro-
vide to poor neighborhoods, to keep the cost of policing down.
So broadening damages liability makes policing more ex-
pensive, and when anything becomes more expensive the natural
tendency is to have less of it. The tendency is likely to be greater
for a service that helps some people but is paid for by others. It
is likely to be still greater if the people who pay have an easy
exit from the system, if they can keep their jobs, move to the
suburbs, and thereby avoid paying to keep other people's streets
safe.
The conclusion is fairly depressing. The exclusionary rule
cannot reach a great deal of street-level police conduct, and it
creates some incentive for the police to shift more attention to-
ward the category it cannot reach. That means somewhat less
police searching of serious offenders, and somewhat more police
harassment of innocents. Damages, meanwhile, make street-
level policing more expensive; the likely result is less policing, at
least in those neighborhoods that cannot foot the bill themselves.
Both results are perverse.
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III. CONCLUSION
Though the preceding argument is necessarily sketchy, it
should be clear enough by now why legal regulation in this area
is so hard. Courts cannot know the things they need to know in
order to do a good job of defining liability rules. Even if they
could, the remedies at courts' disposal cause as many problems
as they solve.
It does not follow that Terry doctrine is a complete failure,
nor that courts should simply abandon the field and leave street
policing to the police. Indeed, Terry may have had more good
consequences than bad, though it surely has had some bad ones.
And one can grant everything I have said and still conclude that
courts have a significant part to play in keeping street policing in
line.
The part is, however, a modest one. If reasonableness
means here what it means in, say, tort theory-if the law's job is
to define and enforce norms of proper or efficient behavior-the
law is destined to fail. That means Terry's ambition, or at least
the ambition most law professors have for Terry, is bound to fail.
For that ambition is nothing less than to use the courts to bal-
ance the competing interests at stake in street policing, to keep
"good" policing legal and make "bad" policing illegal. It is an im-
possible target. Unsurprisingly, the law has missed it.
One could easily have a different target, and a great many
Terry cases do suggest a different target. Indeed, Terry itself
does so: Portions of Warren's opinion are famously attentive to
the limits of judicial power.26 The law might seek not to separate
good police-citizen encounters from bad ones, but to separate
egregious encounters from the rest. On this reading of reason-
ableness, "reasonable" means something closer to "plausible"
than to "right." That is a target courts can probably hit. Judges
cannot feasibly define and enforce standards of good police be-
havior on the street. But judges probably can punish the worst
police behavior on the street. That enterprise is, as Allen and
Rosenberg's argument suggests, a good deal less satisfying to
theorists, and to some judges, than the more ambitious enter-
prise of shaping the basic norms of street policing. But the less
satisfying enterprise is likely to be productive; the more ambi-
26 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1968) (emphasizing the exclusionary
rule's limited reach).
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tious one is not.
That more ambitious enterprise can and should go forward;
it should just go forward outside the court system. Policing
strategies are a huge political issue these days, as other cities try
to replicate New York's success at bringing street crime down.
(It is widely, though not necessarily correctly, assumed that New
York's crime drop has a great deal to do with New York's polic-
ing strategies.)27 The number and importance of privately paid
police is exploding, a development that will surely shape the al-
location and funding of public police services in coming years.
City governments and police forces themselves are experiment-
ing with citizen review boards and other sorts of administrative
mechanisms for identifying and sanctioning police misbehavior,
a development Debra Livingston rightly emphasizes in her work
on the regulation of policing.28 These are the forces-local poli-
tics, market forces, administrative innovation-that are likely to
play the largest roles in shaping street-level policing in the near
future. To those whose attention is focused on courts, that
sounds like bad news, but the opposite is true. Courts are much
less flexible, less attuned to cultural and political forces, than
politicians or markets. And courts are less good at experiment-
ing than local administrative bodies; among other things, stare
decisis makes it hard to abandon failed experiments. Finally, all
these non-judicial forces have a virtue that courts do not: None
of them is prone to an excess of theory.
In this setting, that is a virtue. If Allen and Rosenberg's
thesis is right anywhere in criminal procedure, it is right about
Terry doctrine. The temptation of people in my business, and
probably of people in the business of judging as well, is to think
of ways the law can fix things, ways it can better protect impor-
tant interests, or better fine-tune police officers' incentives to do
good things and avoid doing bad ones. In this setting, we can go
forward with that enterprise only by isolating one or two vari-
ables and pretending the rest don't exist. Suppose privacy pro-
tection is the sole aim of Terry doctrine-or is it preventing dis-
crimination? Suppose the police are always motivated by a
27 For a good discussion of the factors that might have contributed to New
York's crime drop, see Jeffrey Fagan et al., Declining Homicide in New York City: A
Tale of Two Trends, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 1998).
28 See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public
Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997).
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desire to find evidence that can be used in criminal prosecu-
tion-or are they always indifferent to evidence gathering? If we
start by acknowledging even a large fraction of the forces at
work in street policing-and, equally important, a large fraction
of the limits on judging-the enterprise must quickly change. It
turns out that in Terry's sphere, there is much greater potential
for the law, for courts, to make things worse than to make things
better. Perhaps that should be the focus of legal theory. Maybe,
like physicians, we ought to begin with the one goal we have a
good prospect of reaching: First, do no harm.
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